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The European Union (EU) and Mercosur talks have been stalled since discussions were 
resumed in 2000. Recurring protectionist and institutional obstacles have slowed down 
negotiations. The financial crisis, however, has resulted in low domestic demand in the EU. 
This has made the interregional association agreement (IAA) with Mercosur more 
attractive. The loss of the Generalized Scheme of Preference (GSP) status and the lack of a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU have both disadvantaged Mercosur. A further 
window of opportunity is opening up in Mercosur. In Brazil, there have been cries for a 
change in government. In Argentina, presidential elections will take place in October 2015 
and will assuredly bring an end to Kirchnerismo. A change in leadership in both countries is 
expected to make agreement more likely. Protectionist policies are not expected to remain 
as high if there is change in government. This will provide the EU with an opportunity to 












The EU Mercosur relationship is nearly as old as Mercosur itself. 1992 saw the EU and 
Mercosur conclude their first agreement.1The EU and Mercosur achieved further 
integration at the Madrid European Council in December 1995 with the signing of an 
Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement.2 This agreement, however, was intended 
to serve only as a “foundation” for a more comprehensive agreement.3 
In 2000, negotiations for the Interregional Association Agreement (IAA) began, but 
did not run as smoothly this time around. The trade chapter was the most complicated. 
Agriculture was the biggest obstacle for the EU, while for Mercosur it was manufacturing 
and services. An agreement could not be reached and negotiations ended in 2004.4 
Meanwhile, however, the EU concluded many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The 
EU/Mexico FTA came into force in 2000 and the EU/Chile Association Agreement in 2002.5 
In 2012, the EU successfully concluded a comprehensive trade agreement with Colombia 
and Peru.6 In 2014, Ecuador signed up to the same agreement.7 Mercosur, due to its own 
internal obstacles, was unable to do so.  
Negotiations were reinitiated in May 2010 at the Madrid European Union and Latin 
America and Caribbean (EU-LAC) summit, where both regions expressed their commitment 
to “an ambitious and balanced agreement”.8 It has been jointly estimated by the European 
Commission and Brazil’s Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, that the 
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agreement would provide €9 billion in gains, €4.5 billion for each side.9 Five years later, 
however, there has not yet been an agreement, despite the fact that there have been nine 
rounds of negotiations, and despite the continued affirmation of intent to conclude the 
agreement.10  
The research question will be the following: which factors, if any, can make 
conclusion of the IAA more likely this time around? To answer this question, I will first of all 
examine the interests that both blocs have in concluding the agreement, as well as the 
obstacles which stood and continue to stand in the way of said agreement. The paper will 
then look at domestic politics in both Brazil and Argentina to show that a political window 
of opportunity is opening up. The hypothesis will thus be as follows: the chances of the IAA 
being concluded in the near future are higher given the transformations that will occur in 
both Brazil and Argentina.  
For the purpose of the paper, I will define “Free Trade Agreement” as an agreement 
in which both parties agree to trade freely with one another without imposing tariffs and 
“Interregional Association Agreement” as an “international agreement that the European 
Union has concluded with third... blocs with the aim of setting up an all-embracing 
framework to conduct bilateral relations”.11 
1. European Union Interest in the IAA 
Economically speaking, Mercosur is less important to the EU than vice-versa. This was 
reiterated by an official of the European Commission, who described the IAA as being an 
“opportunity” for the EU and a “need” for Mercosur.12 
Mercosur is an important trade partner for the EU in manufactured goods. The 
export of services is also quite significant. In 2012, EU exports to Mercosur in this area 
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amounted to €18.5 billion.13 The EU has a clear comparative advantage in these areas. An 
FTA would therefore undoubtedly benefit these sectors, increase exports and provide jobs. 
The EU enjoyed a balance of trade surpluses in both goods and services in 2010, 
2011 and 2012, with the exception of goods in 2011.14 More generally, they also show 
increased trade flows. The financial crisis, by the same token, has also increased the EU’s 
interest in the IAA. Financial crises lead to “inadequate domestic demands” and this in turn 
creates an economic need to find new markets abroad in order to grow.15 
Government procurement, an area that has traditionally been sheltered from 
competition, is of increasing interest to the EU. Its ambition to have a standard-setting role 
in the global political economy is evident here. Common standards were first introduced 
into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the form of an Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA) at the 1979 Tokyo Round. Further agreement came during 
the Uruguay Round, 1986-1994, resulting in an expansion of the GPA to include not only 
services, but also additional government entities.16 However, as it is only a “plurilateral” 
agreement, not all World Trade Organisation (WTO) members have signed up to it,17 hence 
the EU’s interest in agreeing common standards with Mercosur. Government procurement 
is regarded as an area of “significant untapped potential for EU exporters”, as at present 
companies face notable “discrimination practices” from many of the EU’s trading partner.18 
These contracts amount to roughly €1000 billion a year of world trade flows.19 Government 
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procurement is therefore of paramount importance to the EU. Its exclusion would be a deal-
breaker.20 
Consolidating its market share in Mercosur is also important.21 The EU is 
Mercosur’s most important trade partner. The EU already has, therefore, a strong presence 
in the region and it is in its interest to consolidate and build on this presence. The 
agreement would do this by encouraging further political and economic cooperation.  
What adds some sense of urgency to the EU in these negotiations is the need to 
counteract US and Chinese influence in the region. Mercosur’s relationship with the US, 
similar to its relationship with the EU, is one of dependence.22 Therefore, changes in 
Mercosur-US relations inevitably affect those it has with the EU. Its relationship with China 
is also becoming more relevant and as such also merits analysis. 
The EU traditionally feared a pan-American bloc emerging which would be able to 
play a standard-setting role in the world economy.23 This is highlighted by the increase in 
EU engagement with Mercosur that resulted from the US-led Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) process. In June 2001, the EU made a unilateral offer to Mercosur in an 
attempt to quicken proceedings.24 The EU feared that the FTAA would have had what Alan 
Hardacre calls a “Mexico effect”, whereby the US would gain a larger market share at the 
expense of the EU.25 However, this process, which would have created an area of free trade 
encompassing both North and South America, with the exception of Cuba, lost its 
momentum in 2005 as the Mercosur countries and Venezuela, at the time not a member, 
opposed it.  
Given that this process failed in 2005, rivalry from the US is not as strong as it was. 
However, it is still present. The US is Mercosur’s third most important trade partner.26 
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Moreover, Jeb Bush, Governor of Florida and Republican presidential hopeful, has stated 
his interest in reviving the FTAA process.27 This, of course, does not pose an immediate 
threat to the EU’s interests in the Southern Cone, but it could in the future. 
Chine poses a more immediate threat to the EU’s presence in the region. China has 
been growing at an alarming rate. In 2013, it grew 7.7%.28 This level of growth has led to a 
commodities boom, which has subsequently enabled Mercosur to increase its share of 
exports to the country. China is Mercosur’s largest export destination.29 The “adoption” of 
new protectionist measures by both the EU and the US facilitated this diversion of exports 
to China.30 Chinese exports to Mercosur have also increased, although they were still 
behind those of the EU in 2013. China is moreover interested in establishing a “free trade 
zone” with Mercosur.31 
If these trends result in China gaining a larger market share in Mercosur, the bloc 
will not be as pressured into signing an IAA with the EU.32 This will give it leverage in future 
negotiations with the EU, thus making conclusion of the IAA less likely. If the EU fails to 
close the deal now, it will have to make more concessions in the future, making it less likely 
that it will have the necessary domestic support to ratify the agreement. It is therefore 
essential that the EU makes a sufficient offer to Mercosur sooner rather than later. 
2. Mercosur Interest in the IAA 
The loss of the Generalised Scheme of Preference (GSP) status is a major factor pushing 
Mercosur into concluding the IAA. This scheme allows developing countries to pay fewer 
duties on their exports. As of January 2014 onwards, however, Brazil, Argentina, and 
Uruguay stopped benefitting from GSP as they are now classified as high or upper-middle 
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28 The World Bank, International Development Association, GDP Growth (Annual Data), retrieved 20 
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2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111832.pdf 
30 E. Cardoso and M. Holland, OECD, Development Centre, South America for the Chinese? A Trade-
Based Analysis, Paris, OECD, 2010, cited in O’Connor, loc. cit. 
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income countries by the World Bank.33 Paraguay still benefits from the scheme. Failure to 
reach an agreement with the EU means that it will have to compete with other exporting 
countries that do benefit from GSP status, as well as those that have already concluded 
have FTAs. This means it is facing competition from virtually every rival in the region, 
except Cuba. 
Given that the EU is Mercosur’s first trading partner, concluding the IAA would 
undoubtedly benefit its export sector. This will, of course, only be the case if the EU opens 
its markets to agricultural products. Exports in this area to the EU make up the largest 
proportion of all Mercosur exports. In 2013, agriculture amounted to 43% of total exports to 
the EU, while raw materials came in second place at 28%.34 It is actually quite impressive 
that Mercosur, in light of the import tariffs, is able to export so much of its agricultural 
produce to the EU. Should this protectionism be relaxed as part of the IAA, Mercosur would 
be able to reach more of its economic “potential” in this area.35 
FDI from the EU is also of significant importance to Mercosur. In 2012, it amounted 
to €280 billion.36 Given that the EU is its main supplier of FDI, it is undoubtedly in its 
interest to consolidate these investments by concluding the IAA. Increased investment 
between the two regions would have added benefits. It would facilitate the transfer of 
technology and the exchange of knowledge.37 This is something that is of particular 
interest to countries of Mercosur as they seek to develop their economies. FDI flows from 
the EU, however, are uneven. The only European country that contributes a significant 
amount of its FDI to Latin America relative to other regions is Spain. This accounted for 
30% of Spain’s investment stock during 2006-2011.38 Spanish firms moreover supply nearly 
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31 October 2012. 
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half of the FDI in the region emanating from Europe.39 Even though Spanish firms continue 
to prioritize Mercosur for investment, new markets are becoming more and more 
interesting to them.40 The financial crisis is moreover negatively affecting Spanish 
investments in the region. In 2013, FDI from Spain was much lower than in previous 
years.41 In the longer term, this could lead to sustained reductions in Spanish FDI.  
Concluding the IAA with the EU would help to reverse this trend. There can be no 
doubt that it would lead to increased FDI from the EU. It is no coincidence that Brazil and 
Mexico, the two countries that have strategic partnerships with the EU, soak up the vast 
majority of EU FDI in Latin America. Concluding the IAA would not only help to consolidate 
FDI inflows from countries such as Spain, it would also incentivise other European 
countries to invest more in the region. 
Mercosur also has strategic aims in these negotiations concerning its own 
legitimation as a viable economic entity. Its viability as a regional entity is constantly being 
questioned.42 For this reason it engages in political dialogue as a way to legitimate itself as 
a global actor.43 Failure to conclude the IAA with the EU this time around will put its 
viability into question once again. This scenario is unacceptable to many policy-makers in 
Mercosur’s most important country, Brazil, who are keen on agreeing more FTAs. One 
example is former development minister, Luiz Fernando Furlan. According to him, Brazil 
would benefit from leaving the bloc and signing bilateral agreements.44 The only reason 
why Brazil has not left the bloc is that it continues to value Mercosur. Yet if Brazil is to play 
a leadership role in the region via Mercosur, it is absolutely essential that it has FTAs with 
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fracaso de Mercosur’, El País, 20 June 2014. 
43 B. Ruiz and A. R. Puntigliano, ‘The European Union and the making of South American 
Regionalism’, in Lombaerde, Philippe and Michael Schulz (eds.), EU and World Regionalism. London, 
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44 ‘Former Brazilian minister blames Argentina for the lack of EU/Mercosur trade accord’, 
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the world’s main economies. Concluding the IAA with the EU would dispel a lot of the 
criticism about its credibility and would keep the bloc together. 
3. Why has an agreement not been reached yet? 
In spite of the aforementioned reasons which seem to render the IAA of interest to both 
regions, agreement has not yet been reached. 
3.1. Protectionism 
From the EU side, we can identify protection of agriculture as the main obstacle to an 
agreement. Aggarwal and Fogarty contend that the strategies of the EU are determined by 
the interests of specific interest groups.45 In the case of its relations with Mercosur, we can 
consider that agricultural interests play a role.   
According to the Argentine Embassy, access to agricultural markets remain too 
restrictive,46 while on the other hand an interview with a European Commission official 
highlighted the Commission’s somewhat misplaced belief that access to these markets is 
no longer such. Despite being a “sensitive” area which the EU does not want to see fully 
liberalised, it is nonetheless willing to gradually open up parts of the sector through 
“quotas”.47 It is hard to know yet if this is the case, however. The most recent CAP reforms 
took place in 2013 and are thus only in their infancy. They mainly entailed a change in the 
direct payments regime and to a lesser degree the ending of quotas.48 The reforms cannot 
hurt, but they certainly do not provide for a significant opening up of EU agricultural 
markets to Mercosur in the future. The main hurdle remains the lack of progress achieved 
during the Doha Round.49 
What is clear is that protectionist tendencies are strong due to the strength of 
agricultural interests. Agricultural interests are well-engrained at Member State level and 
have always been well represented. At the EU level, the interests of farmers are represented 
by the Committee of Professional European Agricultural Organisations (COPA) and by the 
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General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives (COGECA). Farmers’ interests continue 
to have strong platforms, at both national and supranational level, from which they oppose 
a liberalisation of agriculture. This base allowed agricultural interests to oppose the 
agreement during the period 2000-2004 and from the beginning of the negotiations in 
2010.50 The recent reforms of the CAP are, however, indicative of a weakening of the 
agricultural lobby. This could enable the EU to make a more ambitious market-access offer 
to Mercosur. 
From the Mercosur side, we can identify the protection of both the manufacturing and 
services sectors as the main obstacles.  In Brazil, protection of the manufacturing sector 
from international competition has been the norm over the years. Consensus existed for 
this from both business elites and civil servants.51 In an age when most countries are 
removing barriers to trade, Brazil is increasing them. It has an applied customs tariff of 
13.5% and is seen by the EU as one of the countries that has the most trade-restrictive 
measures.52  
In Argentina, trade-restricting policies are also the norm. So much so in fact that the EU 
challenged Argentina’s import licensing regime in the WTO in 2012.53 Some of these 
restrictive policies include the non-automatic issuing of import licenses and tough pre-
approval requirements. The lack of transparency in their issuance is another factor which 
further exemplifies Argentina’s protectionism.54 
Lowering trade restrictions remains incomplete, which shows how much of an obstacle 
this has been in these negotiations.  
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3.2. Institutional Obstacles 
Both regions face substantial obstacles in relation to their institutional structures. First 
of all, neither is a sovereign state.  
From the EU perspective, getting a negotiating mandate in a Council of, at the time, 
fifteen Member States to enter into negotiations in the first place proved difficult. The 
initial mandate that the Commission received met with serious “reservations” concerning 
agriculture, notably from France and Ireland.55 These reservations were to mark the 
subsequent 15 years of stalemate in the negotiations. Its mandate is therefore inflexible.  
There are also many veto players. The EU faces more obstacles in this regard. This can, 
however, increase its leverage in the negotiations.56 This potential block allows it to 
attempt to exclude areas in which it has defensive interests, such as agriculture, and 
include areas in which it has offensive interests, such as government procurement on the 
basis that it needs to satisfy these different sectors. Yet Mercosur, by relying solely on 
intergovernmental decision-making, also gains leverage, hence the stalemate. 
The EU must have unanimous support in the Council to ratify the agreement. 
Furthermore, the European Parliament (EP), thanks to the increased powers it received with 
the Treaty of Lisbon, has to give its consent to international trade agreements. The EP 
could potentially cause the agreement to collapse, as it did with the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 2012. Domestic interests at the Member State level that are 
well mobilized will be able to influence their MEPs in rejecting or in giving their consent to 
an agreement. 
Mercosur, on the other hand, does not have as many veto players. It has only 5 Member 
States and no parliament with supranational powers. Nevertheless, it still needs the 
unanimous consent of these members to conclude the agreement. The main obstacle in 
this regard is Mercosur’s “insistence on strict intergovernmentalism”.57 This logic makes it 
tough for the countries to even come up with joint proposals. The EU at least has the ability 
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to negotiate somewhat independently of its members once it has received a mandate. This 
obstacle will, for Mercosur, continue to be relevant in the foreseeable future given Brazil’s 
reluctance to cede sovereignty.58 
4. What has changed to make the conclusion of the IAA more likely? 
4.1. Changes in Brazil’s Domestic Politics 
The changes occurring in Brazilian domestic politics at the time of writing have game-
changing potential for EU-Mercosur relations. 
In an age where trade liberalisation has been the norm, Brazil has continued to favour 
its domestic market. Protectionist policies have been implemented over the last decade by 
both Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) presidents “Lula” da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. Lula 
became president in 2003. He was re-elected in 2006 and stayed on until 2011. Under his 
leadership, Brazil has become a lot more protectionist. He reintroduced what were called 
“strategic development plans”, for instance, to privilege specific domestic industries in 
certain sectors of the economy through financial support and protection against 
competitive imports.59 These policies have distorted trade. This is now being felt more 
acutely as the commodities boom has ended and it can no longer rely on exports to 
China.60 
Rousseff, who won the 2010 elections, has continued her predecessor’s policies. Import 
tariffs have increased. In 2012, for example, a tariff increase of 25% was applied to an extra 
one hundred goods emanating from outside Mercosur.61 In addition to mere import 
protection, Rousseff has been expanding the role of the state, thus making many local 
industries increasingly dependent on government spending,62 which is unsustainable in the 
longer-term. The assumption on the part of many Brazilian policy-makers was that Brazil 
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had a sufficiently large internal market, which would be able to allow for some 
protectionism without actually damaging economic growth.63 
Figure 1: Annual GDP Growth in Brazil 
 
Source: Authors elaboration. This graph takes the figures for annual GDP growth in 2010, 2011, 2012 
and 2013 from the World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG and 2014 
figures from Focus Economics http://www.focus-economics.com/countries/brazil 
 
This has not been the case. The figures for annual GDP shown in figure 1 
demonstrate this. There has been a marked reduction in growth in Brazil since 2010. It 
therefore makes economic sense to look for new opportunities abroad by concluding the 
IAA.  
In spite of Rousseff’s protectionist proclivities, some analysts are confident that 
she will embrace a more trade-oriented stance vis-à-vis the EU as a way of encouraging 
Brazilian companies to export, as there is significant potential for growth in this area. Only 
13% of Brazil’s GDP is made up exports.64 She has already made changes to her cabinet, 
which is a sign that she is not completely ignoring Brazil’s economic woes. She unveiled a 
new economic team committed to improving Brazil’s economic performance soon after her 
re-election in October 2014.65 
These low figures for economic growth are moreover causing reverberations in 
Brazil’s domestic politics, which will push Rousseff into changing her policies regardless. 
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This has led to the emergence of increased sectoral interests that are favourable to more 
open economic policies that will improve the country’s economic growth. Traditionally, the 
extremely competitive agricultural sector was the main group pushing for free trade.66 
Nowadays, however, manufacturing lobby groups are also calling for FTAs with the EU. 
Conclusion of the IAA would give them improved access to cheap inputs and give them 
greater access to technology.67 Brazil’s most important industrial lobby, the Federação das 
Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP) in 2013 called for a conclusion.68 
A deteriorating economic environment will combine with emerging trade initiatives to expose 
the vulnerabilities of the country’s current trade policy. As a result, adjustments are likely... 
Brazil’s proclivity toward protectionism is expected to unwind.69 
Brazil is now an upper-middle income country. The middle class grew in recent years 
and now accounts for 52% of Brazil’s population.70 A lot of people in this category, however, 
are seen as “vulnerable” as many of them have “precarious incomes and unstable 
employment”.71 This will be an important factor in changing Brazilian policy from one of 
protectionism to one based somewhat more on the principles of open trade. In addition to 
not being conducive to economic growth, protectionist policies are driving up inflation and 
in this way affecting the spending-power of the newly emerged middle class.72 This will 
increase Rousseff’s reluctance to implement protectionist measures which are seen as 
increasing the cost-of-living. Such measures would not have the support of this socio-
economic category which was, after all, “torn between” voting for Rousseff or Aécio Neves, 
the more pro-business candidate.73Rousseff will not want to lose these votes. This, as a 
result, will lead to an easing of Brazil’s protectionist policies. 
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Rousseff is moreover in an extremely weak position politically. She was just barely re-
elected as president in October 2014. She won only 51.4% of the vote in the second round, 
while Neves received 48.5%.74 This would indicate that large swathes of Brazil’s population 
are dissatisfied with her management of the economy. 
Domestic dissatisfaction with her leadership has moreover grown in recent months 
as a result of the scandal involving Petrobras, a state-controlled oil company of which she 
was chairwoman during 2003-2010, the period in which the corrupt practices that are now 
coming to light took place. The affair involved cases of money laundering and bribery in 
which both directors of domestic construction companies and PT politicians were 
implicated. The sheer scale of the scandal has had huge domestic repercussions. There 
have been massive protests in over 160 cities and many have called for Rousseff’s 
impeachment.75 
Legally speaking, Rousseff has avoided implication. She is nonetheless highly 
vulnerable politically. A motion of censure is more likely now than it was before. However, 
this process is quite complicated. It requires the approval of the President of Congress as 
well as a two thirds majority in both houses.76 Yet, even if it this scenario is not particularly 
likely, the mere fact that such a course of action is being talked about is indicative of her 
tenuous grip on power.  
If elections were to be called, she would lose them, especially given her abysmal 
approval rating of 13% in March 2015.77 Neves, who narrowly missed out on being elected 
president in October 2014, vowed to open Mercosur if he were elected.78 Marina Silva, a 
presidential candidate who reached the top of the polls in the mid stages of the campaign, 
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also affirmed her intention to seek a trade deal with the EU.79A change in leadership would 
undoubtedly increase the chances of the negotiations succeeding. 
Failing that, it is expected that the economic slowdown and popular discontent with 
current policies will make the IAA with the EU more attractive to the current leadership. 
Furthermore, agricultural interest groups, now reinforced by the manufacturing sector, will 
be putting huge pressure on Rousseff into concluding the agreement.  
4.2. Changes in Argentina’s Domestic Politics 
The late Néstor Kirchner of the Peronist party, the Partido Judicialista, was elected in 
2003. He ruled the country until 2007, when he stepped aside for his wife Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner. She was elected that year and again in 2011. In 2011, Kirchner was 
re-elected with 54% of the vote, while her nearest adversary, received 17%.80 In spite of the 
strong support, economic woes are increasing and will contribute to changing the future 
direction of Argentina’s economic policies.  
Economically speaking, the years following the 2001 default have been characterized 
by protectionism. This has prevented Mercosur from concluding FTAs with its trading 
partners. These measures, the government argues, have helped it to protect domestic 
industries.81 Detractors, however, claim that these steps isolate Argentina from global 
markets and leave it “vulnerable to retaliatory policies from its key trading 
partners”.82Argentina has already been affected negatively by failing to conclude FTAs with 
the world’s most important economies. This has been exacerbated by the loss of GSP. Its 
interventionist policies have also alienated it internationally and frightened investors. In 
2012, for instance, it nationalized YPF, a subsidiary of Repsol, a Spanish energy company.83 
Opposition leaders see these policies as damaging to Argentina’s interests and are 
turning away from them. They are calling for economic policies that will improve relations 
with its trading partners. Both Sergio Massa of the Frente Renovador and Mauricio Macri of 
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the Propuesta Republicana party, the two main opposing presidential candidates, have 
signed a joint document in which they promise to bring Argentina closer to the EU and the 
US.84 Moreover, the “oficialista”, the candidate of the party that is currently in power, Daniel 
Scioli, is also believed to favour a similar shift in policy.85 
Economic weaknesses are also to be found in Kirchner’s search for partners in China 
and Russia. Critics warn of the “asymmetrical nature of the relationship” with China.86 Her 
visit to Russia ended with the signing of a “strategic partnership” in the areas of oil and 
gas.87 This supposed trade dependence on the two countries will provide opposition 
candidates with more fuel to add to their campaigns. 
The most purely economic factor that will change the political landscape in Argentina is 
cost of living. “Inflation of as much as 40% is the biggest economic challenge Argentina 
faces,” according to Massa.88 Inflationary problems will be one of the main economic 
arguments that opposition candidates will use to win the presidential election in October 
2015.  
These economic challenges will weaken the government. The opposition candidates 
will be in a strong position to win the elections and implement new economic policies. 
There will therefore be a new window of opportunity as Argentine negotiators, who will be 
now more in favour of concluding the IAA with the EU, will no longer be dragging their feet.  
The Kirchner years have moreover been plagued with allegations of corruption and 
authoritarianism.89 Recently, in 2014, Kirchner’s vice-president, Amado Boudou, was 
charged with accepting a bribe amounting to a 70% share in Ciccone, a firm that enjoys 
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huge profit-making contracts from the Argentine government for printing Pesos.90 
Indicative of Argentina’s authoritarianism is the Nisman Affair. Alberto Nisman, an 
Argentine prosecutor, was murdered days after he claimed that President Kirchner and her 
foreign minister Hector Timmerman had attempted to protect Iranian officials from 
implication in the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing of a Jewish centre which killed eighty-five 
people.91 He had accused her of cutting a deal with Iran to secure oil.92 He was found dead 
the day before he was to present his 289-page report to the parliament. It is impossible to 
know if his murder was planned by the government. Nevertheless, the fact that such a 
prominent opposition figure was murdered at all is indicative of the unstable domestic 
political landscape. This has the potential, albeit unlikely, to bring the government down 
before the end of her mandate.93 Kirchner still has an approval rating of 29.8%.94. However, 
it is her disapproval rating of 63.5% which is significant.95This affair will, at the very least, 
contribute to the domestic dissatisfaction with her leadership and make it less likely that 
she will be re-elected. 
The Argentine constitution moreover only allows for two terms in office. Kirchner will 
not be able to run again, unless the constitution is amended. However, her party does not 
have the requisite two-thirds majority in the lower house to do this. Her party will therefore 
lose its emblematic leader. A change in leadership will make conclusion of the IAA easier, 
given her administration’s tendency to slow down negotiations.96 
Pressure from Brazil will also play a role in forcing the new leadership into not hindering 
the agreement. Argentine economic policy is tied to Brazil’s. Argentina has traditionally 
enjoyed the “lucrative” Brazilian market for manufactured goods, something it fears 
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losing.97 It also fears Brazil concluding its own FTA with the EU. If Brazil and the EU 
conclude an FTA, not only will Argentina lose out to EU competition for its manufactured 
products, but it will also lose out on agricultural exports to the EU as it will become cheaper 
for Brazilian farmers in relative terms. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper is hopeful that the IAA will be concluded in the coming years. Much has 
changed in recent times to make agreement more likely. During the initial period, 2000-
2004, the cost of no agreement was low to both countries. Nowadays, the cost of no 
agreement is higher, particularly for Mercosur.  
The EU’s strategy of concluding FTAs has disadvantaged Mercosur and left it on the 
margins of the international trade. The loss of GSP status has moreover increased its 
export costs and its need for an agreement. Failure to conclude the IAA with the EU risks 
further commercial isolation.  
The EU’s interest in the agreement has increased, albeit not as dramatically as 
Mercosur’s. It is still more of an ‘opportunity’ for the EU than a ‘need’. The financial crisis 
has resulted in weak domestic demand, which may pressurise the EU into looking for 
export markets. Concluding the IAA with Mercosur would give it access to one of the 
world’s most important emerging markets. This would strongly benefit its manufacturing 
and services sectors, not only through increased trade flows, but also through government 
procurement possibilities. Furthermore, rivalry from China in the regions is increasing 
rapidly, thus threatening the EU’s market share there. The threat of increased US rivalry in 
the region is also something that could affect negotiations in the coming years. 
The journey ahead is also seen in a positive light because of the domestic political 
changes that will occur in Mercosur’s two most important economies. In Brazil, President 
Rousseff will have to change her protectionist policies in response to domestic demands 
emanating from business sectors and middle classes, if she can hold on to power that is. 
In Argentina, President Kirchner will be vacating the Casa Rosada in November 2015 and 
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will not be running again. The leading candidates to succeed her are all in favour of 
improved relations with the EU.  
These political transformations in both Brazil and Argentina will facilitate a more 
free-trade-friendly agenda on the part of Mercosur. This will create the window of 
opportunity that is needed. The ball will be in the EU’s court once these changes occur in 
Brazil and Argentina. The timing is undoubtedly right, or at the very least about to be right, 
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